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References: 30 U.S.C. §§ 201-209, as amended by the Federal
Coal Leasing Amendments Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (1976).
43 C.F.R. Parts 3450, 3470, 3480 (1984).
I. Background - Developments Before Enactment of the FCLAA 
A. Prior to August 4, 1976, the date of enactment of 
the FCLAA, the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as then 
amended, delegated broad discretion to the 
Secretary of the Interior with respect to federal 
coal leasing but provided few standards for exer­
cise of that discretion.
1. The Secretary of the Interior was authorized 
to issue coal prospecting permits for a term 
of two years. If, within that two-year 
period, the permittee showed that the land 
contained coal in commercial quantities, the 
permittee could apply for a preference right 
lease for all or part of the land included in 
his permit. (30 U.S.C. § 201(b)).
a. As construed by the agency for nearly 
60 years, a prospecting permitee who 
established the presence of commercial 
quantities of coal in the area covered by 
the permit was automatically entitled to
such a preference right lease. (Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc, v. 
Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 555 n.5, 557-558 
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Utah International , Inc, 
v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 962, 964 (D. Utah 
1979)).
b. For a definition of commercial quantities 
Interior relied upon U.S.G.S. determina­
tions of whether the coal deposit existed 
and whether it was workable, i.e., could 
be mined by existing technology. (Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 609 F.2d at 
556, n.7; Utah International, 488 F. Supp. 
at 964-965).
c. Many pre-FCLAA leases were issued in this 
manner. (H.R. Rep. No. 94-681, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 17 (1975)).
2, The Secretary was also authorized to award
leases by competitive bidding or by such other 
methods as he might by regulation adopt. (30 
U.S.C. § 201(a)). Few pre-FCLAA leases, how­
ever, were issued following competitive bid­
ding where multiple bids were received./ (H.R. 
Rep. No. 94-681 at 17).
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3. The leases awarded required the lessees to pay 
a royalty of at least five cents per ton and 
an annual rental beginning at a minimum of 25 
cents per acre and escalating to a minimum of 
fifty cents per acre in the second year and to 
a minimum of one dollar per acre in the sixth 
year. (30 U.S.C. § 207).
4. The leases were for indeterminate periods upon 
condition of diligent development and contin­
ued operation of the mine or mines, except 
when such operation was interrupted by 
strikes, the elements, or casualties not 
attributable to the lessee. (30 U.S.C.
§ 207 ) .
a. Diligent development and continued
operation were not defined by regulation 
before December, 1974. (H.R. Rep. No.
94-681 at 12-15). Lease terms did little 
more than recite the statutory language of 
diligent development and continued opera­
tion. Neither the regulations nor the 
lease terms provided any standards or 
mechanism for enforcement of those condi­
tions .
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b. Administration of the diligence require­
ments was lax. No proceeding to cancel a 
lease for lack of compliance with dili­
gence requirements was ever initiated.
(H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 14-15). Percep­
tions of the value and marketability of 
the federal coal reserves (primarily 
western deposits of low-sulphur coal 
located at great distances from many 
potential markets) may have contributed to 
the lack of interest in enforcing the 
diligence requirements.
5. The Secretary had discretion to accept payment 
of an annual advance royalty upon a minimum 
amount of coal in lieu of the provision 
requiring continuous operation of the mine, 
provided that he determined this was in the 
public interest and that the amount of the 
advance royalty was at least equal to the 
amount of rentals. (30 U.S.C. § 207).
a. In practice this provision was construed 
to permit payment of an annual advance 
royalty upon a minimum amount of coal in 
lieu of development as well as operation 
after production had begun.
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b. Payment of these nominal advance royalties 
in lieu of development and extraction of 
coal reserves was a common practice. 
According to testimony before the House 
Subcommittee on Mines and Mining in 1975, 
474 of 533 federal coal leases were held 
under a waiver of the condition of con­
tinued operation issued by the Secretary 
and payment of advance royalties. (H.R. 
Rep. No. 94-681 at 14-15).
6. The Secretary could also permit suspension of 
operations under a coal lease for a period up 
to six months at any one time when market con­
ditions were such that the lease could not be 
operated except at a loss. (30 U.S.C. § 207).
7. The leases issued also included the further 
condition that at the end of each twenty-year 
period following the date of the lease, the 
Secretary of the Interior could make such 
readjustment of terms and conditions as he 
might determine, unless otherwise provided by 
law at the time of expiration of such twenty 
year period. (30 U.S.C. § 207).
8. The pre-FCLAA statute also limited the right 
of common-carrier railroads to obtain federal
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coal leases in excess of their own needs
(30 U.S.C. § 202), authorized consolidation or 
collective prospecting, development and opera­
tion of coal fields (30 U.S.C. §§ 201-l(a), 
205), authorized the lease of additional 
tracts upon the same conditions as the orig­
inal leasehold upon a showing by the lessee 
that all workable coal deposits would be 
exhausted within 3 years thereafter (30 U.S.C. 
§ 204), and authorized the issuance of limited 
licenses to take coal for local domestic needs 
without an obligation to make royalty payments 
(30 U.S.C. § 208).
B. By the 1970's, federal coal leasing was widely
regarded by the administration, Congress and public 
interest groups as undesirable for a variety of 
reasons.
1. It was perceived that the public received an 
inadequate and unfair return on its coal 
lands.
a. The amounts of production royalty, rental 
and advance royalty payments required by 
federal coal leases were far below ^air 
market value as measured by the terms fee 
leases then received. The average federal
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production royalty over 54 years of leas­
ing was only 12.5£ per ton. Although 
royalty rates had increased seventy five 
percent since 1920, the price of a ton of 
coal had more than doubled, so the actual 
production royalty paid was a smaller 
percentage of the value of the coal than 
it had been in 1920. (H.R. Rep. No.
94-681 at 18).
b. Few coal leases issued were the result of 
competitive sales. Many were preference 
right leases, and of those leases issued 
by competitive bidding, seventy two 
percent were bid upon by less than two 
bidders. Since the amount of the bid is 
related to the number of bidders, leases 
for which only one bid was received were 
less likely to result in a fair return to 
the public. (H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 17)
2. The public also received an inadequate return 
because most federal coal leases were 
undeveloped and did not produce coal, 
a. Prior to an informal Interior decision to 
impose a coal leasing moratorium in 1971, 
acreage under lease had increased while
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production had declined. Acreage under 
lease had increased from about 80,000 
acres in 1945 to 778,000 acres in 1970, or 
1/1000 of 1 percent of the public lands. 
Production in that period, however, had 
declined from 10 million tons in 1945 to 
7.2 million tons in 1970. (Sen. Rep. No. 
94-296, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975)).
b. Most federal coal leases were nonproduc­
ing. Of 533 leases outstanding in 1975, 
only 59 were in production. (H.R. Rep.
No. 94-681 at 14-15). Ninety-one and one- 
half percent of the land under federal 
coal leases was held under nonproducing 
leases. (H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 11).
c. Many such leases had been held for years 
by the payment of nominal advance 
royalties permitted by the Secretary in 
lieu of development. (H.R. Rep. No.
94-681 at 14-15).
d. There was an absence of any meaningful
diligence criteria to assure production
/ Junder existing leases. The Department of 
the Interior had never defined the terms 
"diligent development" and "continued
-8-
operation" before December, 1974 and had 
never cancelled a lease for failure to 
comply with those conditions. (H.R. Rep. 
No. 94-681 at 14-15).
3. There was also a widespread belief that only 
speculators benefitted from the federal coal 
leasing program as it existed in 1975. Coal 
lease brokers, rather than companies which 
were coal producers, held significant amounts 
of coal lands. As of 1970, 761,000 acres of 
public and acquired lands included within out­
standing coal prospecting permits were held 
principally by speculators. (Sen. Rep. No. 
94-296 at 9. See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 
14-16). Speculators who had obtained coal 
leases and prospecting permits at prices below 
fair market value received, or had the poten­
tial to receive, substantial profits when the 
demand for coal increased in the early 1970's.
4. The oil shortage in the early 1970's created 
new and increased demand for coal by utilities 
and industry. Production was slow to 
increase, and critics pointed to the number of 
nonproducing federal leases as a factor con­
tributing to the shortage.
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a. The ownership of leases by speculators, 
rather than coal producers, was seen as 
one reason for lack of production.
b. Concentrations of holdings as evidenced by 
the fact that fifteen leaseholders held 
leases on two-thirds of the leased federal 
coal acreage was regarded as a further 
restraint on production. (H.R. Rep. No. 
94-681 at 15-17).
c. The fact that some of the companies with 
the largest number of federal coal leases 
or acres were owned by major oil or mining 
companies also raised concerns about pos­
sible disincentives to produce coal. 122 
Cong. Rec. 484 (1976) (comments of
Rep. Young).
5. Growing concern with land use planning and the 
environmental impact of coal leasing and min­
ing led to questions about the wisdom of 
Interior's reactive leasing in answer to 
stated needs of industry and its inability to
deny preference right leases to prospecting
/
permittees who were otherwise entitled to them 
regardless of the impact on the environment. 
(H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 18-19); Natural
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Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Berklund,
609 F.2d 553, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
C. The administrative response to these concerns was 
to stop leasing until new regulations to provide 
the Secretary with greater administrative control 
over the leasing system could be adopted.
1. From May, 1971 to February, 1973, the Bureau 
of Land Management issued no coal leases.
(H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 11).
2. The Secretary undertook to develop a new 
leasing system so that the size, timing and 
location of coal leases would more effectively 
meet the U.S.'s energy needs. In February, 
1973, the Secretary of the Interior suspended 
further issuance of coal prospecting permits 
and halted all federal coal leasing (except 
under short term relief criteria). (H.R. Rep. 
No. 94-681 at 11).
3. In December, 1974, Interior published proposed 
regulations to address the problem of specula­
tive holding of leases and that of lease 
size. Those regulations established locigal 
mining units and defined diligent development 
and continuous operation. Diligent develop­
ment was defined in terms of work directed
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toward production of coal, rather than in 
terms of a certain amount of production. It 
included environmental studies, geological 
studies, mapping, surveying, engineering, and 
other work done in preparation to mine. 
Continuous operation meant production of 
commercial quantities of coal without inter­
ruptions greater than 6 months. (H.R. Rep.
No. 94-681 at 12-14).
D. In the meantime, Congress took over the problem of 
federal coal leasing and focused on the royalty and 
diligence issues.
1. In the royalty area, Congress drew a compar­
ison between the coal industry and the oil and 
gas industry and imposed a typical oil and gas 
lessor's royalty of a minimum of 12-1/2 
percent on federal coal leases, except that a 
lesser royalty of 8 percent could be applied 
to underground coal mines. (Fair Market Value 
Policy for Federal Coal Leasing, Linowes 
Commission Report (1984), p. 287).
a. This was a substantial increase from the 
prior royalty rate of a minimum of five 
cents per ton.
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b. The increase was not tied to the realities
of coal development which, unlike oil and 
gas, typically requires a large initial 
investment and significant continuing 
investment over the life of the mine.
2. In the diligence area, Congress set detailed 
standards of diligence and provided for harsh 
and absolute penalties for failure to meet 
those standards.
a. Diligence was defined in terms of achiev­
ing a certain amount of production within 
a set period and maintaining a particular 
amount of production thereafter, rather 
than in terms of investment or good 
faith. The definition apparently was 
selected without regard for the long lead 
times needed to bring a coal mine into 
production or the need to arrange for 
special transportation arrangements and 
long-term purchaser contracts before 
development and marketing can begin. The 
definition also ignored the effect of 
market conditions, events of force 
majeure, and other limitations on the 
development and operation of coal mines.
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(Letters of Assistant Secretary of 
Interior to Senate Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, dated July 17, 1975, 
Sen. Rep. No. 94-296 at 48-49, and to 
House Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, dated July 22, 1975, H.R. Rep.
No. 94-681 at 38-39; Sen. Rep. No. 94-296 
at 60-61 (comments of Sen. Hansen). See 
also Linowes Commission Report, pp.
294-95).
b. The penalties for lack of compliance with 
the diligence requirements, cancellation 
of the nonproducing lease or disqualifica­
tion of the lessee from making application 
for future leases, permit no exercise of 
discretion by the Secretary to mitigate 
their effect in individual cases.
II. Diligence Criteria Under the FCLAA.
A. Section 6(b) of the FCLAA (30 U.S.C. § 207(b)) 
provides that:
Each lease shall be subject to the condi­
tions of diligent development and con­
tinued operation of the mine or mines, 
except where operations under the lease . /
are interrupted by strikes, the elements, 
or casualties not attributable to the 
lessee. The Secretary of the Interior, 
upon determining that the public interest 
will be served thereby, may suspend the
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condition of continued operation upon the 
payment of advance royalties ... [f]or an 
aggregate number of years during the 
period of any lease ... [which shall] not 
exceed ten.... Nothing in this subsec­
tion shall be construed to affect the 
requirement contained in the second 
sentence of subsection (a) of this 
section relating to commencement of pro­
duction at the end of ten years.
(See also 43 C.F.R. § 3475.5 (1984)).
1. Diligent development is defined as production
of recoverable coal reserves in commercial 
quantities (one percent of recoverable coal 
reserves) within a ten year period. (43 C.F.R. 
§ 3480.0-5(a)(6), (12), (13) (1984)).
2. Continued operation means production of not 
less than commercial quantities (one percent) 
of recoverable coal reserves in each of the 
first two years following achievement of dili­
gent development and an average amount of not 
less than one percent of recoverable coal 
reserves per year thereafter, computed on a 
three-year basis consisting of the year in 
question and the two preceding years.
(43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-5(a)(6), (8), (9) (1984)).
3. Each lease issued after enactment of the FCLAA 
is required to achieve diligent development 
within ten years after its effective date and
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is thereafter subject to the requirement of 
continued operation. (43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.1(a)(1), (2) (1984) ) .
4. Each lease issued prior to enactment of the 
FCLAA is required to achieve diligent develop­
ment within ten years after the first lease 
readjustment after August 4, 1976, or the 
operator's prior election to be subject to the 
FCLAA, and is thereafter subject to the 
requirement of continued operation.
(43 C.F.R. § 3483.1(b)(1)(2) (1984)).
5. The diligent development requirement cannot be 
suspended or extended. (30 U.S.C. § 207(b);
43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(b)(1) (1984)).
6. The condition of continued operation may be 
suspended upon application if the Secretary 
determines that suspension is in the public 
interest. (30 U.S.C. § 207(b); 43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.3(a) (1984)).
a. That condition may be suspended by the
period of time during which the authorized 
officer finds operations are interrupted 
by strikes, the elements, or casualties 
not attributable to the operator/lessee. 
(30 U.S.C. § 209; 43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(a)(1) 
(1984)).
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b. It also may be suspended upon the payment 
of advance royalty in an amount equal to 
the production royalty (8 percent if the 
coal would be recovered only by under­
ground mining operations; 12-1/2 percent 
if it would be recovered by surface mining 
operations) due on the production of one 
percent of the recoverable coal 
reserves. (30 U.S.C. § 207(b); 43 C.F.R. 
§§ 3483.3(a)(2), 3483.4(a), (c) (1984)).
Advance royalty may not be accepted in 
lieu of the requirement of continued oper­
ation on any lease for more than ten 
years. (43 C.F.R. § 3483.4(d) (1984)).
It may be credited against production 
royalties due during the initial twenty 
year term of the lease. (43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.4(e), (f) (1984) ) .
7. Operations and production also may be
suspended upon application if determined to be 
in the interest of conservation by the 
Secretary. (30 U.S.C. § 209; 43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.3(b) (1984)).
a. Such suspensions do not apply to the 
diligent development period, but do
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suspend all other lease terms including 
rental and royalty payments. Minimum 
annual production requirements are pro­
portionately reduced for that portion of a 
federal lease year for which operations 
are so suspended. (43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.3(b)(1), (2) (1984)).
b. The term of the lease will be extended by 
adding any period of suspension to it. .
(43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(b)(3) (1984)).
8.. Not all production must be credited toward 
achievement of diligent development.
a. All production on post-FCLAA leases after 
the lease effective date must be credited 
toward diligent development. (43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.5(a)(1984)).
b. Production on pre-FCLAA leases after the 
effective date of the first lease 
readjustment after August 4, 1976 must be 
credited toward diligent development.
(43 C.F.R. § 3483.5(b) (1984)).
c. For pre-FCLAA leases which have not been 
readjusted and which the operator/lessee 
elected to subject to the FCLAA diligence 
requirements prior to August 30, 1983, all
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production between August 4, 1976 and the 
effective date of the election may be 
credited toward diligent development. All 
production after the effective date of the 
election, however, must be so credited.
(43 C.F.R. §§ 3483.1(b)(1), 3483.5(c), (d)
(1984)).
d. For pre-FCLAA leases which have been 
readjusted after August 4, 1976, all 
production between August 4, 1976 and the 
effective date of the first lease 
readjustment may be applied toward dili­
gent development if the operator/lessee so 
requests. Such a request must comply with 
the election requirements under 43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.1(b)(1), and presumably the opera­
tor must have made this request prior to 
August 30, 1983 as well. (43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.5(e) (1984)).
B. Section 6(c) requires submission for the
Secretary's approval of:
an operation and reclamation plan prior 
to taking any action on a leasehold which 
might cause a significant disturbance of 
the environment, and not later than three 
years after a lease is issued.
(30 U.S.C. § 207(c)).
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1. The regulations permit extension of the three- 
year period for filing a resource recovery and 
protection plan upon application and after a 
determination by the Secretary that it is in 
the public interest. Interruption of opera­
tions by strikes, the elements, or casualties 
not attributable to the operator/lessee permit 
an extension, but payment of advance royalty 
does not. (43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(a) (1984)).
C. Similar diligence requirements apply to logical 
mining units (LMUs) under Section 5 of the FCLAA. 
(30 U.S.C. § 202a(2); 43 C.F.R. § 3487.1(h)(2) 
(1984)). An operator/lessee may initiate, or the 
authorized officer may direct, consolidation of 
coal leases into LMUs upon a determination that 
maximum economic recovery of coal would be served 
thereby. 30 U.S.C. § 202(a)(1); 43 C.F.R.
§ 3487.1(b) (1984)). An LMU is a consolidation of 
one or more federal leases and may include inter­
vening or adjacent private or state-owned coal 
deposits in a single unit of no more than 25,000 
contiguous acres under the control of a single 
operator and worked as a single operation. (30 
U.S.C. § 202a(1), (7); 43 C.F.R. § 3487.1(f)(1),
(5) (1984)).
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1. An LMU, like an individual lease, must achieve
diligent development within a ten year 
period. (43 C.F.R. § 3483.1(a)(1) (1984)).
For LMUs containing a pre-FCLAA lease which 
has not been readjusted after August 4, 1976, 
prior to LMU approval, the diligent develop­
ment period begins on the effective approval 
date of the LMU. (43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-
5(13)(ii)(A) (1984)). For LMUs without such a 
lease, the diligent development period begins 
on the effective date of the most recent 
federal lease issuance or readjustment prior 
to LMU approval. (43 C.F.R. § 3480.0- 
5(13)(ii)(B) (1984)).
2. After achieving diligent development an LMU
must maintain continued operation for every 
continued operation year thereafter. (43 
C.F.R. § 3483.1(a)(2) (1984)). The condition
of continued operation may be suspended upon 
application if it is determined to be in the 
public interest. (43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(a)
(1984)).
a. That condition may be suspended when
operations are interrupted by strikes, the 
elements, or casualties not attributable
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to the operator. (43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.3(a)(1) (1984)). 
b. It may be suspended upon payment of 
advance royalty. (43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.3(a)(2) (1984)). The amount of 
advance royalty must be equal to the 
production royalty (8 percent if the coal 
is mined by underground operations; 12-1/2 
percent if it is mined by other means) due 
on production of one percent of the 
federal LMU recoverable coal reserves.
(43 C.F.R. § 3483.4(c) (1984)). This 
option may be exercised for no more than 
ten years. Periods of payment of advance 
royalty on individual leases in the LMU 
prior to their inclusion in the LMU are 
not considered in calculating the ten-year 
period. (43 C.F.R. § 3483.4(d) (1984)). 
Advance royalties may be credited against 
production royalties during the initial 
twenty year term of the LMU, and advance
royalties paid on leases in their initial
/
term prior to inclusion in the LMU may 
also be credited against LMU production 
royalties to the extent they were not
-22-
previously credited against lease produc­
tion royalties. (43 C.F.R. § 3483.4(f)
(1984)).
3. The authorized officer may also suspend the 
requirement of continued operation in the 
interest of conservation. (30 U.S.C. § 209;
43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(b) (1984)). In that
instance all terms and conditions of the LMU, 
including rental and royalty payments and 
excepting the diligent development period, are 
also suspended. (43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(b)(1)
(1984) ) .
4. Production anywhere within the LMU of either
federal or nonfederal coal reserves applies 
toward satisfaction of the conditions of dili­
gent development and continued operation. (43 
C.F.R. § 3483.6(a) (1984)). Any production
credited to a federal lease prior to its 
inclusion in an LMU also applies toward dili­
gent development for the LMU. (43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.5(g) (1984)).
5. Operators of LMUs also are required to file 
plans for resource recovery and protection 
within three years of approval of the LMU.
(43 C.F.R. § 3487.1(e)(1) (1984)).
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a. That period may be extended if the
Secretary determines it is in the public 
interest. Interruptions of operations by 
strikes, the elements, or casualties not 
attributable to the operator are events 
authorizing extension. (43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.3(a)(1) (1984)).
6. Any federal lease included in an LMU is 
subject to the diligence requirements imposed 
on the LMU in lieu of those that would apply 
to the lease individually. (43 C.F.R.
§§ 3475.6(b), 3483.1(c), 3487.1(b), (e)(4) 
(1984)).
7. An additional diligence requirement applies to 
LMUs. The reserves of an LMU must be mined 
within a period established by the Secretary 
which is not more than 40 years. (30 U.S.C.
§ 202(a)(3); 43 C.F.R. § 3487.1(e)(6) (1984)).
D. In order to qualify for new leases under Section 3 
of the FCLAA, a prospective lessee which already 
has federal coal leases, or which has an affiliate
or a subsidiary, is controlled by, or is under
/
common control with an entity holding federal coal 
leases, must meet a separate diligence require­
ment. Those federal coal leases which the prospec-
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tive lessee or its related entity holds and has 
held for ten years must be producing coal in com­
mercial quantities. (30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2)(A); 43 
C.F.R. § 3472.1-2(e) (1984)).
1. "Producing coal in commercial quantities" is 
not yet defined by regulation.
2. The Bureau of Land Management proposes to use 
the definition of commercial quantities used 
for the Section 6 diligence standards, namely 
one percent of recoverable coal reserves, in 
this situation as well. (50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 
6399 (1985)).
3. The proposed definition of producing, however, 
is considerably more complicated. The Bureau 
proposes to use a moving 10-year bracket, 
which begins on various dates depending upon 
the type of lease, to determine whether the 
lease is producing as required. These dates 
are;
a. the date of lease issuance for leases 
issued after August 4, 1976;
b. the date of first lease readjustment for 
pre-FCLAA leases which were first 
readjusted after August 4, 1976;
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c. the date production began for pre-FCLAA 
leases which have not been readjusted 
after August 4, 1976 and which began 
production after August 4, 1976;
d. the date ten years prior to the date on 
which a new lease is sought for pre-FCLAA 
leases which have not been readjusted 
after August 4, 1976 and which began 
production prior to August 4, 1976.
(50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 6402-04 (1985)).
4. A nonproducing lease included in a producing
LMU does not prohibit the lessee, or any 
affiliate, from qualifying for another federal 
lease after August 4, 1986. (50 Fed. Reg.
6398, 6404 (1985)).
5. Nonproducing leases, or leases in nonproducing 
LMUs, which are under suspension because of 
force majeure strikes, the elements, or 
casualties not attributable to the 
operator/lessee), payment of advance royalty 
in lieu of continued operation, or a suspen­
sion under 30 U.S.C. § 209 do not prohibit the 
lessee, or any affiliate, from qualifying for 
another federal lease after August 4, 1986.
(50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 6404-05 (1985)).
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III. Penalties for Lack of Diligence
A. Section 6(a) of the FCLAA requires termination of 
leases which fail to meet the diligence require­
ments of that Section.
A coal lease shall be for a term of 
twenty years and for so long thereafter 
as coal is produced annually in commer­
cial quantities from that lease. Any 
lease which is not producing in commer­
cial quantities at the end of ten years 
shall be terminated.
(30 U.S.C. § 207(a)) .
1. There is no question that any federal coal 
lease issued after enactment of the FCLAA on 
August 4, 1976 which is not producing in 
commercial quantities ten years after the 
lease effective date will be terminated.
(43 C.F.R. §§ 3483.1(a), 3483.2(a) (1984)).
2. Termination of leases for failure to achieve
diligent development also applies to pre-FCLAA 
leases ten years after election by the 
operator/lessee to be subject to the FCLAA, or 
the first lease readjustment after August 4, 
1976. (43 C.F.R. §§ 3483.1(b)(1), (2),
3483.2(a) (1984)). Upon readjustment the 
lease will be made subject to the conditions 
of diligent development and continued opera­
tion in Section 6 of the FCLAA. (43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.1(c) (1984)).
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3. Leases which do not maintain continued
operation or fail to submit a resource 
recovery and operation plan are subject to 
cancellation. (43 C.F.R. § 3483.2(c), (d)
(1984)).
4. Similar penalties apply to LMUs which do not 
meet diligence requirements. (43 C.F.R.
§§ 3483.1(a)(1), (2), 3483.2(a), (d)
(1984)). If an LMU is terminated for failure 
to achieve diligent development, the federal 
leases in it are subject to the diligence 
requirements that would have applied if they 
had not been in the LMU. (43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.2(b) (1984)). Production from the LMU
cannot be prorated among the individual leases 
once the LMU terminates, so each lease must 
meet the diligence requirements on its own.
(47 Fed. Reg. 33114, 33170 (1982)).
B. Section 3 of the FCLAA disqualifies those with
certain nonproducing leases from applying for new
leases. It provides that:
The Secretary shall not issue a lease or 
leases under the terms of this Act to any / 
person, association, corporation, or any 
subsidiary, affiliate, or persons con­
trolled by or under common control with 
such person, association, or corporation, 
where any such entity holds a lease or
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leases issued by the United States to 
coal deposits and has held such lease or 
leases for a period of ten years when 
such entity is not, except as provided 
for in section 207(b) of this Act, pro­
ducing coal from the lease deposits in 
commercial quantities. In computing the 
ten-year period referred to in the pre­
ceding sentence, periods of time prior to 
the date of enactment of the Federal Coal 
Leasing Amendments Act of 1975 [August 4, 
1976,] shall not be counted.
(Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-377, § 3, 90 Stat. 1083
(1976); See also 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2)(A));
43 C.F.R. § 3472.1-2(e) (1984)).
1. Neither the statute nor the regulation makes 
any distinction between pre-FCLAA leases and 
post-FCLAA leases for purposes of application 
of the Section 3 disqualification to lease. 
Based upon the legislative history, this lack 
of distinction was intentional and designed to 
provide an incentive to lessees with pre-FCLAA 
leases to bring their holdings into 
production.
The problems of speculation are 
addressed directly by H.R. 6721, 
which requires termination of any 
lease which is not producing in 
commercial quantities at the end of 
[10] years. Old leases (those 
existing on the date of enactment of 
the 1975 Act) would be exempt from 
this provision, except to the extent 
it might be made applicable upon
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readjustment of lease terms, but the 
lessees would be prohibited from 
acquiring any new Federal leases 
should they continue to hold old 
leases ten years after enactment 
without producing therefrom.
(H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 15 
(emphasis added). See also H. R.
Rep. No. 94-681 at 22; 122 Cong.
Rec. 489 (1976) (comments of Rep.
Mink, sponsor of the bill in the 
House)) .
2. The ten-year period in Section 3 is separate 
and independent of the ten-year diligent 
development period required by Section 6. The 
Section 3 period began on August 4, 1976, the 
date of enactment of the FCLAA, and that 
Section's penalty will apply on August 4,
1986, ten years after enactment of the 
FCLAA. (43 C.F.R. § 3472.1-2(e) (1984). See
also H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 22).
3. Section 3 provides for exceptions to the 
August 4, 1986 deadline, but under current 
Interior regulations, none applies when the 
company seeking additional leases, or its 
affiliate, subsidiary or other entity under
common control, has held a coal lease for ten
/
years which is not producing coal in com­
mercial quantities and still holds that lease 
on August 4, 1986. The exceptions are limited
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to leases which have achieved diligent 
development and are subject only to the con­
dition of continued operation.
a. Prior Interior regulations had adopted a
construction that the exception for 
"strikes, the elements, or casualties not 
attributable to the operator/lessee" in 
30 U.S.C. § 207(b) tolled the ten-year 
period under Section 3 for all pre-FCLAA 
leases, even for those which had not 
achieved diligent development by August 4, 
1986. (43 C.F.R. §§ 3472.1-2(e),
3475.4(b) (1980)).
b. Current regulations, however, preclude 
such a construction and limit the excep­
tion to those leases which have achieved 
diligent development and are then subject 
only to the condition of continued opera­
tion. (43 C.F.R. §§ 3472.1-2(e), 3483.4 
(1984)).
c. The recent publication of the draft 
proposed guidelines for administration of 
Section 3 contains language which may 
indicate the Bureau of Land Management is 
considering force majeure suspensions for
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IV.
leases subject to the FCLAA requirement of 
diligent development but which are not yet 
subject to the condition of continued 
operation.
After a lease or LMU is subject 
to either diligent development 
or continued operation,
Section 2(a)(2)(A) may be satis­
fied by a force majeure 
suspension (strikes, the ele­
ments, or casualties not 
attributable to the lessee) if 
approved by the Secretary.
(50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 6404 (1985)).
4. The Bureau is also considering regulations to 
further determine what is an affiliate under 
the Section 3 lease disqualification provi­
sion. (50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 6400 (1985)).
5. The Section 3 prohibition does not apply to 
modifications of leases to add acreage or 
reserves to a lease because application of
_ this Section in that situation could result in 
the bypass of coal. (50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 6405 
(1985)).
Interim Solutions for Compliance with Diligence 
Requirements /
A. Inclusion of a nonproducing lease in a logical
mining unit (LMU) may have the effect of extending
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the period in which a particular lease must be 
developed under Section 6 of the FCLAA.
1. If a pre-FCLAA lease which was readjusted after 
August 4, 1976 and/or a post-FCLAA lease are 
included in an LMU that does not contain a pre- 
FCLAA lease which has not been readjusted after 
August 4, 1976, the ten-year diligent development 
period begins on the effective date of the most 
recent lease readjustment or issuance. (43 C.F.R. 
§ 3480.0-5(a)(13)(ii)(B)(1984)). For example, if 
a lease issued on March 1, 1960 and readjusted on 
March 1, 1980 is combined in an LMU with a lease 
readjusted on June 1, 1982 or a lease issued on 
June 1, 1982, the ten-year diligent development 
period for the LMU begins on June 1, 1982. That 
adds more than two years to the time in which the 
lease originally issued in 1960 must be 
developed. (43 C.F.R. § 3480.05(a)(13)(ii)(B) 
(1984); 47 Fed. Reg. 33114, 33157-58 (1982)).
2. Inclusion in an LMU does not benefit pre-FCLAA 
leases which have not been readjusted.
a. To include such a lease in an LMU, a
lessee necessarily elects to subject it to 
the FCLAA diligence requirements which 
otherwise would not be imposed until
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readjustment. (43 C.F.R. § 3487.1(b),
(e)(4) (1984)).
b. Inclusion in an LMU effectively shortens the 
period of time in which these leases must 
achieve diligent development. For example, a 
May 15, 1968 lease and an April 1, 1974 lease 
are included in an LMU approved June 10, 1985. 
The LMU diligent development period begins on 
the LMU approval date, June 10, 1985, and ends 
on June 10, 1995. If the leases were not 
, included in such an LMU they would be readjusted 
on May 15, 1988 and on April 1, 1994, 
respectively, at which times their ten year 
diligent development periods would begin.
(43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-5(a)(13)(ii)(A)
(1984); 47 Fed. Reg. 33114, 33157-58 
(1982)).
3. There are disadvantages to formation of an
LMU.
a. After coal has been produced from the LMU, 
the 40-year period in which the LMU's 
recoverable coal reserves must be /
exhausted begins. (43 C.F.R.
§ 3487.1(e)(6) (1984)).
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b. If the LMU fails to achieve diligent 
development and is terminated, the leases 
in that LMU are individually subject to 
the diligent development and continued 
operation requirements which would have 
applied if the leases had never been 
included in an LMU. (43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.2(a), (b) (1984) ) .
c. Production from an LMU cannot be prorated 
among the individual leases after the LMU 
terminates, so then each lease must meet 
the diligent development and continued 
operation requirements on its own or be 
terminated. (47 Fed. Reg. 33114, 33170
(1982)).
B. Sale or exchange of the entire interest in a pre- 
FCLAA lease which is not producing in commercial 
quantities to an unrelated entity in an arms-length 
transaction will relieve the holder of that lease 
of the Section 3 disqualification from acquisition 
of new leases. Relinquishment of the entire 
interest in such a lease will also avoid applica­
tion of the Section 3 disqualification.
1. The company assigning, exchanging, or
relinquishing a nonproducing pre-FCLAA lease
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which it holds and will have held for ten
years on August 4, 1986 becomes eligible to 
acquire future leases. (Letter to Sen. John 
Warner, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and 
Mineral Resources, from Legislative Council, 
Interior Department, dated December 2, 1983).
2. The company acquiring the nonproducing pre-
FCLAA lease does not thereby become subject to 
the Section 3 disqualification because it will 
not have held the nonproducing lease for ten 
years on August 4, 1986. It, however-, does 
not necessarily have a full ten-year period to 
achieve diligent development of the assigned 
lease. If that lease has been readjusted, the 
assignee has the number of years remaining of 
the ten-year period beginning on the readjust­
ment date to achieve diligent development. If 
that lease has not been readjusted, the 
assignee will have ten years from the 
readjustment date to achieve diligent develop­
ment. Lease assignment does not affect the
diligent development requirement of Section 6
/
of the FCLAA. (Letter to Sen. John Warner, 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral 
Resources, from Legislative Council, Interior
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Department, dated December 2, 1983. See also 
50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 6405 (1985)).
3. Such a transfer can be made to any company 
meeting the requirements for coal lease 
applicants. Prior to August 4, 1986, there is 
no limitation on assignments to companies 
holding nonproducing leases which they have 
held for ten years. After that date, the 
Section 3 disqualification applies to assign­
ments of old leases as well as to issuance of 
new leases. (43 C.F.R. §§ 3453.1(a),
3472.1-2(e) (1984)).
4. The Bureau of Land Management is considering 
the policy implications of approving assign­
ments to avoid the prohibition of Section 3 
and has solicited public comment on that 
issue. (50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 6399 (1985)).
V. Problems Created by the Diligence Provisions of the 
FCLAA
A. The definition of diligent development is
unrealistic because it ignores the logistics of 
mine development which typically requires nine 
years or more. It also makes no provision for 
unexpected fluctuations in coal markets or other
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unforeseen events. (Fair Market Value for Federal
Coal Leasing , Linowes Commission Report (1984), 
pp. 294-95).
B. The ten year period for diligent development may 
also encourage lease holders to initiate coal 
development prematurely rather than relinquish the 
lease. This may artificially stimulate excessive 
coal production by overriding market incentives to 
delay production. Conservation of federal coal 
reserves may be impaired as a result. In the long 
run, this also may raise costs to coal users. 
(Linowes Commission Report, pp. 294-95).
C. The penalty of lease termination for failure to 
achieve diligent development in conjunction with 
the unrealistic definition of that condition may 
deter bidder competition and reduce the prices bid 
for federal coal leases. (Linowes Commission 
Report, pp. 169, 295).
D. Diligence requirements make it difficult to rely on 
competitive market mechanisms. Competition 
requires that more reserves be leased than need to 
be produced within ten years. This permits a more 
efficient selection of sites to be mined than if 
the government selects them. That efficiency 
should reduce the price of coal to users. More
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leasing, however, conflicts with the goal of dili­
gence requirements to produce all coal within a 
short specified period. (Linowes Commission 
Report, p. 296).
E. The selection of a ten year period to achieve a 
certain amount of production will lead to arbitrary 
and capricious lease termination in that a lease 
achieving diligent development in nine years con­
tinues, but one that would not achieve it until 
after eleven years would be cancelled. (Linowes 
Commission Report, pp. 296-97).
F. There has been considerable discussion whether the 
Section 3 disqualification is limited to applica­
tions for coal leases or extends to applications 
for any mineral lease issued under the authority of 
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.
1. Research memoranda prepared by the Department 
of the Interior Solicitor's Office and the 
American Petroleum Institute in 1980 concluded 
that the Section 3 disqualification could be 
interpreted to prohibit issuance of mineral 
leases under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 
to any person, association, or corporation 
which either holds and has held for ten years 
a nonproducing coal lease in its own right or
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is a subsidiary, affiliate, or person con­
trolled by or under common control of such a 
person, association, or corporation. This 
construction depends upon a conclusion that 
"this Act" as used in the FCLAA refers to the 
Mineral Leasing Act. Others construe 
Section 3 in this manner as well. (See 
Linowes Commission Report, p. 302; 131 Cong. 
Rec. 2500 (March 5, 1985) (comments of 
Sen. Wallop); 131 Cong. Rec. 941 (Jan. 31,
1985) (comments of Sen. Johnston)) ._
2. The Section 3 disqualification more likely 
only applies to coal leases, 
a. Examination of the context in which the 
Section 3 disqualification appears indi­
cates that it is limited to coal leases.
It is one of several provisions in 
30 U.S.C. § 201(a) that create conditions 
precedent to the issuance of coal 
leases. These include, preparation of a 
comprehensive land use plan, consideration
of the effects of issuing such a lease on
/
local communities, notification of the 
proposed offering in the county in which 
the land is situated, and consultation 
with public entities.
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b. A broad interpretation of the Section 3 
disqualification is also inconsistent with 
the structure of the Mineral Leasing
Act. That Act is divided into "general 
provisions" which apply to all leases 
issued under that Act (30 U.S.C.
§§ 181-193(2)) and "specific provisions" 
which apply to leases of particular 
minerals. (30 U.S.C §§ 201-209 (coal)). 
Section 3 of the FCLAA expressly amends 
Section 2(a) of the Mineral Leasing Act, 
which pertains only to coal leasing 
requirements, and only appears as part of 
30 U.S.C. § 201(a). In the case of those 
sections of the FCLAA intended to apply to 
all mineral leases (Sections 9 and 11, for 
example), Congress amended the general 
leasing provisions rather than those pro­
visions applicable to specific minerals.
c. The legislative history supports a con­
struction of the Section 3 disqualifica­
tion as limited to coal leases. All 
references to the restriction on "new 
leases" are predicated on the prior use of 
language referring to coal leases.
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(122 Cong. Rec. 497 (1976); 122 Cong. Rec. 
489 (1976); 122 Cong. Rec. 19377 (1976);
H. R. Rep No. 94-681 at 22).
d. Construction of the Section 3 disqualifi­
cation as limited to new coal leases is 
also supported by contemporaneous inter­
pretation of the Department of Interior.
On January 25, 1977, the Department 
promulgated regulations implementing the 
FCLAA in part and amending existing rules 
including those relating to mineral leases 
other than coal leases. The Department 
included the Section 3 restriction on new 
lease acquisition only in the new coal 
leasing regulations. (42 Fed. Reg. 441 et 
seq. (1977); 43 C.F.R. § 3525.1(f)
(1977)).
e. Present regulations also support this 
interpretation. The Section 3 restriction 
appears only in regulations setting out 
qualifications for applicants or bidders
on coal leases. (43 C.F.R. § 3472.1-2(e)
/  ■ '
(1984) (coal); 43 C.F.R. §§ 3102.1 et seq. 
(1984) (oil and gas); 43 C.F.R. §§ 3502.1 
et seq. (1984) (minerals other than coal
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or oil and gas). See also 47 Fed. Reg.
33114, 33131 (1982) (comments on rule- 
making for 43 C.F.R. § 3472-1-2(e)).
3. However, uncertainty regarding the scope of 
the Section 3 disqualification remains, and 
until a Supreme Court decision or a change in 
the statute by Congress, coal lessees meeting 
the criteria of 30 U.S.C. § 201 (a)(2)(A) have 
some exposure to disqualification from making 
application for new mineral leases issued 
under the Mineral Leasing Act.
a. Regulations limiting the Section 3 
disqualification to coal leases can be 
changed.
b. In addition, any oil and gas lease issued 
by lottery or competitive bidding may be 
challenged by a disgruntled applicant on 
the basis that the lessee was unqualified 
by reason of the Section 3 restriction.
G. The term "producing in commercial quantities" in 
Section 3 is not clearly defined. That is the 
standard that leases which a lessee, or its 
affiliate, holds on August 4, 1986 and which it has 
held for the prior ten years must meet if the 
lessee is to be eligible to apply for new leases
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under 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2)(A). Obviously, a 
lessee with such a lease that has never produced 
coal is disqualified from acquiring future leases 
under 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2)(A). The uncertainty 
arises where the amount of production is small or 
production is sporadic.
1. Currently, regulations define commercial
quantities only in the context of diligent 
development and continued operation. (43 
C.F.R. § 3480.0-5(a)(6), (8), (12) (1984); 50
Fed. Reg. 6399 (1985)) .
2. The Bureau of Land Management has proposed 
draft guidelines for the proposed administra­
tion of the Section 3 disqualification pro­
vision and solicited comments on the amount of 
production and the time over which it must be 
produced to constitute "producing in commer­
cial quantities." (50 Fed. Reg. 6398 
(1985)). These draft guidelines are discussed 
in more detail at II.D. above.
VI. The perceived purpose of the diligence requirements can 
be achieved in a less disruptive manner. /
A. The purpose of the diligence requirements is to 
discourage speculative holding of nonproducing
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federal coal leases and to encourage good faith 
development of those leases by the lessees.
B. Development incentives can be created by provision 
for payment of substantial annual advance royalties 
for the right to defer development.
C. Such incentives will not be undermined by per­
mitting the Secretary to suspend development 
requirements in cases involving loss of market or 
events of force majeure. The current ten-year 
period in which a lessee must begin mining coal or 
lose the lease is arbitrary and unfair in this 
respect.
D. The Section 3 disqualification provision is 
unnecessary if a provision for payment of sub­
stantial annual advance royalties to defer 
development is adopted. Section 3 is likely to 
have an uneven effect because it would create 
unequal development incentives for different 
companies unlike annual advance royalties.
VII. Program for Corrective Action
A. Congressional relief.
1. In the past, bills to modify the FCLAA,
especially Section 3, have been introduced in 
both houses. None of them have met with 
success.
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2. There are currently two Senate bills to amend 
the FCLAA, S. 372, introduced by Senator 
Johnson, and S. 570, introduced by Senator 
Wallop, pending in the 99th Congress, 1st 
Session. Both were referred to the Committee 
on Energy and Natural Resources. Repre­
sentative Udall is also expected to introduce 
a bill in the House for this purpose.
3. Both Senate bills address the Section 3 
disqualification to lease provision.
a. S. 372 would expressly limit the appli­
cation of that Section to coal leases. It 
also permits lessees subject to that 
Section's restriction to relinquish non- 
producing leases for new leases with 
equivalent estimated reserves, or if the 
lessee holds no more than two nonproducing 
pre-FCLAA leases, to pay an additional 
rental on new leases in lieu of disquali­
fication. In addition, the bill requires 
the Secretary to accept relinquishment of
pre-FCLAA leases where there has not been
/
significant surface disturbance pursuant 
to a permit issued under Section 506 of 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act of 1977.
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b. S. 570 would repeal the Section 3 lease 
disqualification provision.
4. S. 570 proposes to change Section 5 on LMUs.
a. It deletes the requirement that the leases 
in the LMU be contiguous.
b. It deletes the requirement that the 
reserves of the entire LMU be mined within 
40 years.
5. Both Senate bills address the diligence 
criteria of Section 6 and the provision for 
lease cancellation for failure to meet them.
a. Both delete the requirement that produc­
tion in commercial quantities at the end 
of the twenty-year primary term is 
required to hold the lease. S. 372 pro­
poses that the lease continue as long as 
the condition of continued operation is 
met. S. 570 proposes that the lease con­
tinue as long as the conditions of 
diligent development and continued opera­
tion are met.
b. Both delete the absolute requirement that 
a lease attain diligent development, i.e., 
production in commercial quantities, at 
the end of ten years or be terminated. In
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the alternative, they propose a provision 
permitting the lessee to elect to 
relinquish the nonproducing lease or 
extend it beyond the tenth lease year 
through payment of annual advance royal­
ties based upon escalating amounts of 
assumed production through the twentieth 
lease year.
c. Payment of advance royalties in this 
manner would satisfy the diligence condi­
tion under S. 372's revised Section 3 for 
issuance of new leases.
d. Only S. 372 addresses the definitions of 
the diligence requirements. It incorpo­
rates the definitions of commercial 
quantities and diligent development con­
tained in the current Interior regula­
tions. It redefines the diligent develop­
ment period as ten years beginning on the 
effective date of lease issuance for all 
leases, whether issued before or after
August 4, 1986. Finally, it reformulates
/
the definition of continued operation, 
which appears at 43 C.F.R. § 3480.0- 
5(a)(8), to require production of commer-
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cial quantities of recoverable coal 
reserves in each year following the 
achievement of diligent development rather 
than only in each of the first 2 years 
thereafter.
6. Both Senate bills propose deletion of the 
three-year deadline for preparation of an 
operation and reclamation plan.
B. Administrative relief.
1. Interior has already engaged in interpretative 
rulemaking regarding the Section 3 lease 
disqualification by including that restriction 
in only the regulations governing the quali­
fication of applicants for new coal leases.
(43 C.F.R. § 3472.1-2(e) (1984)). That alone, 
however, is insufficient to provide much cer­
tainty for a coal lessee as the statute is 
susceptible to a broader reading.
2. Interior has also proposed guidelines for the 
administration of the Section 3 lease 
disqualification provision. (50 Fed.
Reg. 6398 (1985)).
3. Affected parties could request Interior to 
promulgate a specific regulation on the appli­
cability of the Section 3 disqualification and
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to support it with a Solicitor's Opinion.
That regulation then could be challenged under 
the process provided by the Administrative 
Procedure Act. A ruling of the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on the regulation 
would be strong authority either that the 
Section 3 disqualification applied to all new 
mineral leases or only to coal leases.
C. Judicial Relief
1. An action for a declaratory judgment on the 
scope of the Section 3 disqualification pro­
vision may present standing problems. Until a 
statute or regulation is construed against a 
plaintiff, a court may be unwilling to act. 
That problem is avoided by the rule-making and 
appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act 
as described above.
2. In regard to the Section 6 diligence criteria, 
judicial actions challenging the imposition of 
those criteria on pre-FCLAA leases at 
readjustment, apart from those cases where 
there was a procedural defect in the read­
justment, have proceeded on primarily con­
stitutional grounds.
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